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Abstract
In anonymous broadcast, one or more parties want to anonymously send messages to all
parties. This problem is increasingly important as a black-box in many privacy-preserving
applications such as anonymous communication, distributed auctions, and multi-party compu-
tation. In this paper, we design decentralized protocols for anonymous broadcast that require
each party to send (and compute) a polylogarithmic number of bits (and operations) per anony-
mous bit delivered with O(log n) rounds of communication. Our protocol is provably secure
against traffic analysis, does not require any trusted party, and is completely load-balanced.
The protocol tolerates up to n/6 statically-scheduled Byzantine parties that are controlled by a
computationally unbounded adversary. Our main strategy for achieving scalability is to perform
local communications (and computations) among a logarithmic number of parties. We provide
simulation results to show that our protocol improves significantly over previous work. We fi-
nally show that using a common cryptographic tool in our protocol one can achieve practical
results for anonymous broadcast.
1 Introduction
Today, political and commercial entities are increasingly engaging in sophisticated cyber-warfare
to damage, disrupt, or censor information content [32]. In designing anonymous communication
services, there is a need to ensure reliability even against very powerful types of adversaries. Such
adversaries can monitor large portions of networks and control a certain fraction of the parties to
run sophisticated active attacks such as jamming, corruption, and forging, as well as simple passive
attacks such as eavesdropping and non-participation.
In this paper, we focus on the problem of secure anonymous broadcast, where a set of n parties
want to anonymously send their messages to all parties. Anonymous broadcast is an important tool
for achieving privacy in several distributed applications such as anonymous communication [10],
private information retrieval [12], secure auctions [20], and multi-party computation (MPC). Our
goal is to design a decentralized anonymous broadcast protocol that scales well with the number
of parties and is robust against an active adversary. One motivating application for this protocol
is a decentralized version of Twitter that enables provably-anonymous broadcast of messages.
One challenging problem with most anonymity-based systems is resistance against traffic-
analysis. A global adversary can monitor traffic exchanged between parties to link messages to
the their corresponding senders. Such a powerful adversary was assumed to be unrealistic in the
past but it is believed to be realistic today especially if the service provider is controlled or compro-
mised by a state-level surveillance authority [19]. Unfortunately, well-known anonymous services
such as Crowds [39] and Tor [17] are not secure against traffic analysis attacks.
Two widely-accepted architectures for providing general anonymity against an active adversary
are Mix networks (Mix-Nets) and Dining Cryptographers networks (DC-Nets), both of which were
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originally proposed by Chaum [10, 11]. Mix-Nets require semi-trusted infrastructure nodes and are
known to be vulnerable to traffic analysis and active attacks [38]. DC-Nets [11, 23, 41, 42], on the
other hand, provide anonymous broadcast protocols among a group of parties without requiring
trusted parties. The core idea of DC-Nets is that a protocol for multi-party computation can
be used to perform sender and receiver anonymous broadcast. For example, if party pi wants to
broadcast a message mi anonymously, then all other parties participate in a multi-party sum with
input zero, while party pi participates with input mi. All parties learn the sum, which is mi while
all inputs remain private. This ensures that no party can trace the output message mi to its input,
keeping pi anonymous.
Although DC-Nets are provably-secure against traffic analysis, they face several challenges.
First, a reservation mechanism is required to schedule which party is broadcasting without com-
promising the anonymity of the sender. Second, DC-Nets are susceptible to collisions, which degrade
throughput. A jamming adversary may even use collisions to render the channel useless by con-
tinuously transmitting in every round. Third, typical DC-Nets are not scalable given that the bit
complexity required to anonymously broadcast a single bit among n parties is Ω(n2).
State-of-the-art approaches that address some of these challenges include [14, 23, 41]. The
majority of these methods scale poorly with network size, rendering them impractical for large net-
works. Recently, Zamani et al. [44, 28] proposed the first anonymous broadcast protocol where each
party sends o(n) bits to broadcast a bit among n parties. Their protocol uses multi-party computa-
tion to achieve full anonymity and logarithmic-size groups of parties to achieve O˜(1) communication
and computation costs. Unfortunately, their protocol has polylogarithmic rounds of communication
and is not practical due to large logarithmic factors hidden in the complexity notation.
To the best of our knowledge, every sender and receiver anonymous broadcast protocol that
does not rely on a trusted party consists of at least three steps.
1. Input: Initially, each party holds a message. The party distributes its message or a repre-
sentation of it among all or a subset of parties. This step requires sending Ω(n) messages.
2. Multi-party shuffling: All or a subset of parties participate in a multi-party protocol to
obliviously generate a random permutation of the sequence of message they hold.
3. Output: All or a subset of parties holding a sequence of messages broadcast them to all
parties. This step requires sending Ω(n2) messages for delivering n shuffled messages.
Since much cannot be done to improve the cost of the output phase, we will mainly focus on the
multi-party shuffling step in this paper. Multi-party shuffling can be used as a black-box in multi-
party computation problems. Boyle et al. [7] use oblivious shuffling to randomly choose inputs for
a sublinear function evaluation, where a function is evaluated over o(n) inputs chosen uniformly at
random in the presence of an active adversary. Laur et al. [33] and Goodrich et al. [25] describe
how multi-party shuffling can be used for implementing oblivious database operations and oblivious
storage.
Our Model. In this paper, we consider a network of n parties whose identities are common knowl-
edge. We assume there is a private and authenticated communication channel between every pair of
parties and the communication is synchronous. Our protocol does not require the presence of any
trusted third party, and we do not assume the existence of a reliable broadcast channel. We assume
t < (1/6− ǫ)n of the parties are controlled by an active adversary, for some positive constant ǫ. We
assume our adversary is computationally unbounded and is actively trying to prevent the protocol
from succeeding by attacking the privacy of the parties, and the integrity of communications, by
attempting to corrupt, forge, or drop messages. We say that the parties controlled by the adver-
sary are dishonest and that the remaining parties are honest meaning that they strictly follow our
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protocol. We finally assume that the adversary is static meaning that it must select the set of
dishonest parties at the start of the protocol.
1.1 Our Contribution
In this paper, we design a decentralized protocol for anonymous communication that is secure
against an active adversary. Our protocol is efficient and scales well with the number of parties.
Moreover, our protocol is load-balanced meaning that each party handles a roughly equal amount
of communication and computation. We use techniques from multi-party computation, where a
set of n parties, each having a secret value, compute a known function over their inputs, without
revealing the inputs to any party.
Recently, Boyle et al. [7] and Dani et al. [16] proposed scalable solutions to general MPC.
Unfortunately, both of these protocols are not practical due to large logarithmic and constant
factors in their communication/computation costs. Moreover, the protocol of Boyle et al. is not
load-balanced making it hard to be used in settings like mobile networks where the parties have
limited resources. Despite their inefficiency, we are inspired by [7] and [16] to achieve scalability
by performing local communications and computations in logarithmic-size groups of parties called
quorums, where the number of dishonest parties in each quorum is guaranteed not to exceed a
certain fraction. Using quorums and by simplifying much of their work, we develop an efficient
multi-party shuffling protocol for anonymizing user inputs.
Our protocol is provably-secure as it is based on a formal security framework, which follows
from the security of MPC. We show that the anonymity achieved by this method is, in particular,
resistant to traffic analysis. We also provide provable anonymity against a priori knowledge that an
adversary might have regarding the potential communicating parties. Moreover, unlike the majority
of previous work which rely on centralized trusted servers, our protocol is fully-decentralized and
does not require any trusted party.
Our protocol has polylogarithmic communication and computation costs with respect to the
number of parties. We prove the following main theorem in Section A.
Theorem 1. Consider n parties in a fully connected network with private channels where each
party has a message to send to all parties. There exists an unconditionally-secure n-party protocol
such that if all honest parties follow the protocol, then with high probability 1:
• Each honest party sends its message to all parties anonymously.
• The protocol tolerates up to t < (1/6 − ǫ)n malicious parties, for some positive constant ǫ.
• Each party sends O˜(1) bits and computes O˜(1) operations for shuffling n messages 2.
• Each party sends O˜(1) bits and computes O˜(1) operations for delivering one anonymous bit.
• The protocol has O(log n) rounds of communication.
Protocol Overview. In our protocol, n parties participate in a MPC to jointly compute a shuffling
function that randomly permutes their messages. Then, the results are broadcast to all participating
parties. More specifically, our protocol builds a set of quorums in a one-time setup phase and
then, uses the quorums in the online phase for shuffling input messages. We represent the desired
shuffling function by an arithmetic circuit, where the computation of each gate is assigned to a
quorum. Then, we evaluate the circuit level-by-level, passing the outputs of one level as the inputs
1An event occurs with high probability, if it occurs with probability ≥ 1− 1/nc, for c > 0 and sufficiently large n.
2The O˜ notation is used as a variant of the big-O notation that ignores logarithmic factors. Thus, f(n) = O˜(g(n))
means f(n) = O(g(n) logk g(n)) for some k.
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to the next level. Once the local computation is finished in each quorum, the result is forwarded
to the next quorum via one-to-one communication with parties of the next quorum. Finally, at the
highest level, the shuffled messages are computed and sent to all parties.
One technique for randomly shuffling a set of messages in a multi-party setting is to assign to each
message a uniform random value and then, obliviously sort the messages according to the random
values. One issue with this technique is that if the randoms are not distinct (i.e., there is a collision),
then the resulting distribution deviates from the uniform distribution. Unfortunately, this gives
the adversary some advantage to map the inputs to outputs and thus, break the anonymity. More
formally, let n be the number of messages and [1,M ] be the range of random values we choose for
each message. With n such random values, we can generate Mn possible states while there are n!
possible permutations of the messages. Since n! ∤ Mn, it is easy to see that some permutations
are more likely to be generated than others. On the other hand, we will show that by choosing a
sufficiently large M , we can prevent collisions with high probability. Using the Chernoff bound, we
will prove that choosing M = Ω(kn2 log n) guarantees a uniform random shuffle with probability
1− 1/nk, for any constant k > 0.
2 Further Related Work
Some protocols are built upon a relaxed notion of anonymity called k-anonymity [41, 43, 34],
where the adversary is assumed to be unable to identify the actual sender/receiver of a message
from a set of k parties (called anonymity set). Even though k-anonymity often increases efficiency
significantly, choosing small k’s can result in severe privacy problems. For example, attackers often
have background knowledge and it is shown that small anonymity sets are likely to leak privacy
when attackers have such knowledge [36]. For example, a person located in New Mexico is more
likely to search for a restaurant serving chili stew than a person in Vermont.
Von Ahn et al. [41] develop a cryptographic broadcast protocol based on DC-Nets that is
resistant to a static active adversary. A set of n parties with private inputs compute and share
the sum of their inputs without revealing any parties’ input. The authors introduce k-anonymity,
which means no polynomial-time adversary may distinguish the sender/receiver of a message from
among k honest senders/receivers. To achieve k-anonymity, they partition the set of parties into
groups of size M = O(k) and execute a multi-party sum protocol inside each group. The jamming
detection mechanism is weak against an adversary who may waste valuable resources by adaptively
filling up to M channels. In the case where n-anonymity is desired, the protocol requires O(n3)
messages to be sent per anonymous message and the total bit complexity is O(n4). The protocol
has latency that is O(1) on average when the number of broadcasts is large, but which can be O(n)
in worst case for a single broadcast.
Golle and Juels [23] employ cryptographic proofs of correctness to solve the jamming problem
in DC-Nets assuming a static Byzantine adversary. The protocol detects jamming with high prob-
ability in O(1) rounds, requiring a total communication and computation complexity of O(n2) bits.
Their protocol assumes the existence of a reliable broadcast and a centralized trusted authority for
key management distribution.
The Xor-trees approach of [18] extends DC-Nets to achieve O(n) amortized bit complexity,
which is optimal. In this protocol, only a single user is allowed to send at any one time in a Xor-
tree. Hence, the protocol is subject to performance degradation due to collisions as the number
of users increases. The protocol assumes the existence of a public-key infrastructure and a non-
Byzantine polynomial-time adversary. The total bit complexity of the protocol is O(n2t2) bits in
worst case, where t is the number of dishonest parties. The latency of the protocol is O(n) in
worst case. However, a sender may broadcast large payloads to amortize the costs. The amortized
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latency of the protocol is O(1).
The Verdict protocol of [14] (which is based on Dissent [13]) has a client-server architecture and
uses verifiable DC-Nets, where participants use public-key cryptography to construct ciphertext,
and knowledge proofs to detect and exclude jamming parties before disruption. The protocol
assumes the existence of a few highly-available servers, where at least one server is honest. All
servers must be alive, however, for the protocol to work. An interesting aspect of Verdict is that it
is robust to a large fraction of Byzantine parties (up to n−2). The paper demonstrates empirically
that the system scales well with the number of parties, when the number of servers is fixed. The
Tarzan protocol of Freedman and Morris [21] provides resistance against traffic analysis, but only
against a passive adversary.
The Aqua protocol of Le Blond et al. [34] provides k-anonymity with traffic-analysis resistance
against passive global attacks and active local attacks. The protocol achieves anonymity in a way
similar to Tor (onion routing) and achieves unobservability through traffic obfuscating, which is to
add artificial delay or artificial traffic (called chaff) to the connection.
In the last three decades, a large body of work has been devoted to designing MPC protocols [5,
4, 22, 15]. Unfortunately, most of these protocols are inefficient and scale poorly with the number
of parties. Several MPC sorting and shuffling protocols have been proposed in the literature [24, 33,
45, 26]. Laur et al. [33] describe a multi-party shuffling protocol that can be used for anonymizing a
set of inputs. Although the communication and round complexity of their protocol scales well with
the number of inputs, they scale exponentially with the number of parties and hence, the method
cannot be used in our model, where n is relatively large.
Goodrich [24] proposes an efficient data-oblivious randomized shellsort algorithm. Unfortu-
nately, when implemented in a multi-party setting, this protocol requires O(m) rounds of com-
munication to sort m values and has communication complexity O(ℓ2n2m logm), where ℓ is the
message size. Zhang [45] and Hamada et al. [26] develop constant-round MPC sorting protocols
that scale well with the number of inputs but scale poorly with the number of parties.
3 Preliminaries
In this section, we define standard terms, notation, and results used throughout the paper.
3.1 Notation
An event occurs with high probability, if it occurs with probability at least 1− 1/nc, for any c > 0
and all sufficiently large n. We denote the set of integers {1, ..., n} by [n]. Also, let Zp denote the
additive group of integers modulo a prime p.
3.2 Basic Tools
In this section, we review the definitions of standard basic tools used throughout the paper.
Verifiable Secret Sharing. An (n, t)-secret sharing scheme, is a protocol in which a dealer who
holds a secret value shares the secret among n parties such that any set of t parties cannot gain
any information about the secret, but any set of at least t + 1 parties can reconstructs it. An
(n, t)-verifiable secret sharing (VSS) scheme is an (n, t)-secret sharing scheme with the additional
property that after the sharing phase, a dishonest dealer is either disqualified or the honest parties
can reconstruct the secret, even if shares sent by dishonest parties are spurious. In our protocol,
we use the constant-round VSS protocol of Katz et al. [30] that is based on Shamir’s secret sharing
scheme [40]. This result is described in Theorem 2.
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Theorem 2. [30] There exists a synchronous linear (n, t)-VSS scheme for t < n/3 that is perfectly-
secure against a static active adversary. The protocol requires one broadcast and three rounds of
communication.
For practical purposes, one can use the cryptographic VSS scheme of Kate et al. [29] called eVSS
(stands for efficient VSS), which is based on Shamir’s scheme and the hardness of the Discrete
Logarithm (DL) problem. Since eVSS generates commitments over elliptic curve groups, it requires
smaller message sizes than other DL-based VSS scheme such as [22].
Theorem 3. [29] There exists a synchronous linear (n, t)-VSS scheme for t < n/2 that is se-
cure against a computationally-bounded static adversary. In worst case, the protocol requires two
broadcasts and four rounds of communication.
Quorum Building. A good quorum is a set of N = O(log n) parties that contains a majority of
honest parties. King et al. [31] showed that a Byzantine Agreement (BA) protocol can be used to
bring all parties to agreement on a collection of n good quorums. In this paper, we use the fast BA
protocol of Braud-Santoni et al. [8] to build n good quorums.
Theorem 4. [31, 8] There exists a constant-round unconditionally-secure protocol that brings all
good parties to agreement on n good quorums with high probability. The protocol has O˜(n) amortized
communication and computation complexity1, and it can tolerate up to t < (1/3 − ǫ)n malicious
parties.
Secure Broadcast. In the malicious setting, when parties have only access to secure pairwise
channels, a protocol is required to ensure secure (reliable) broadcast2. Such a broadcast protocol
guarantees all parties receive the same message even if the broadcaster (dealer) is dishonest and
sends different messages to different parties. It is known that a BA protocol can be used to perform
secure broadcasts. In our protocol, we use the BA algorithm of Braud-Santoni et al. [8] to perform
secure broadcasts.
Theorem 5. [8] There exists a constant-round unconditionally-secure protocol for performing se-
cure broadcasts among n parties. The protocol has O˜(n) amortized communication and computation
complexity, and it can tolerate up to t < (1/3 − ǫ)n malicious parties.
Sorting Networks. A sorting network is a network of comparators. Each comparator is a gate
with two input wires and two output wires. When two values enter a comparator, it outputs the
lower value on the top output wire, and the higher value on the bottom output wire. Ajtai et
al. [1] describe an asymptotically-optimal O(log n) depth sorting network. However, this network
is not practical due to large constants hidden in the depth complexity. Leighton and Plaxton [35]
propose a practical probabilistic sorting circuit that sorts with very high probability meaning that
it sorts all but ǫ · n! of the n! possible input permutations, where ǫ = 1/22
k
√
log n
, for any constant
k > 0. For example, for k = 2 and n > 64, we get ǫ < 10−9. While this circuit is sufficient for us
to prove our main results (Theorem 1), one can instead use the O(log2 n)-depth sorting network of
Batcher [3] for sorting all n! permutations at the expense of O(log2 n) protocol latency.
Secure Comparison. Given two linearly secret-shared values a, b ∈ Zp, Nishide and Ohta [37]
propose an efficient protocol for computing a sharing of ρ ∈ {0, 1} such that ρ = (a ≤ b). Their
protocol has O(1) rounds and requires O(ℓ) invocations of a secure multiplication protocol, where
1Amortized communication complexity is the total number of bits exchanged divided by the number of parties.
2We are not aware of any easy approach to physically implement a broadcast channel without assuming a trusted
party.
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ℓ is the bit-length of elements to be compared. We refer to this protocol by Compare. We also
describe a fast multiplication protocol to be used along with the comparison protocol of [37] for
implementing fast comparator gates.
Share Renewal. In our protocol, a shuffling circuit is securely evaluated. Each gate of the circuit
is assigned a quorum Q and the parties in Q are responsible for comparison of secret-shared inputs.
Then, they send the secret-shared result to any quorums associated with gates that need this result
as input. Let Q′ be one such quorum. In order to secret-share the result to Q′ without revealing
any information to any individual party (or to any coalition of dishonest parties), a fresh sharing of
the result must be distributed in Q′. To this end, we use the share renewal protocol of Herzberg et
al. [27]1. To update a shared value s defined over a degree d polynomial φ(x), the protocol generates
a degree d random polynomial δ(x) such that δ(0) = 0. The new polynomial φ∗(x) is then computed
from φ∗(x) = φ(x) + δ(x). Since φ∗(0) = φ(0) + δ(0) = s, the new polynomial φ∗(x) defines a fresh
sharing of s. Combined with the VSS scheme of Theorem 2 (or Theorem 3), this protocol is secure
against an active adversary (with t < n/3), takes constant number of rounds, and requires each
party to send O(n2) field elements. We refer to this protocol by RenewShares throughout this paper.
4 Our Protocol
In this section, we describe our protocol for anonymous broadcast. Consider n parties P1, P2, ..., Pn
each having a message xi ∈ Zp, for a prime p and all i ∈ [n]. The parties want to anonymously send
the messages to each other and receive the results back. We first describe an ideal functionality
of our protocol where a hypothetical trusted party P computes the desired protocol outcome by
communicating with all parties2. In every run of the protocol, P executes a shuffling protocol over
the messages and sends the shuffled sequence of messages to all parties. The shuffling protocol first
chooses a uniform random number ri ∈ Zp to form an input pair (ri, xi) for each party Pi and for all
i ∈ [n]. The protocol then uses a shuffling circuit that is based on the sorting network of Leighton
and Plaxton [35] to sort the set of pairs {(r1, x1), ..., (rn, xn)} according to their first elements. We
later show that this functionality randomly permutes the set of inputs {x1, ..., xn}.
In our protocol, we denote the shuffling circuit by C, which has m gates. Each gate is essentially
a comparator gate and is denoted by Gi, for i ∈ [m]. Our protocol first creates n quorums and
then assigns each gate of C to a quorum. For n parties, the circuit has ⌈n/2⌉ input gates as each
comparator gate has two inputs. We label the quorums assigned to the input gates by Q1, ..., Q⌈n/2⌉
and call them input quorums. C also has ⌈n/2⌉ output gates, which correspond to output quorums
labeled by Q′1, ..., Q
′
⌈n/2⌉.
We now implement the real functionality of our protocol based on the ideal functionality de-
scribed above. Protocol 1 defines our main algorithm. Throughout the protocol, we represent each
shared value s ∈ Zp by 〈s〉 = (s1, ..., sn) meaning that each party Pi holds a share si generated by
the VSS scheme during its sharing phase. Using the natural component-wise addition of represen-
tations, we define 〈a〉 + 〈b〉 = 〈a + b〉. For multiplication, we define 〈a〉 · 〈b〉 = Multiply(〈a〉, 〈b〉),
where Multiply is a protocol defined in this section.
For the reader’s convenience, we now list all subprotocols that we use in our protocol. These
subprotocols are also defined in this section, Section 3, and Section B.
• GenRand: A well-known technique (due to [4]) that generates uniform random secrets by
adding shared values chosen uniformly at random by each party. Defined as Protocol 3 in
Section B.
1This technique was first used by Ben-Or et al. [5] and was later proved to be UC-secure by Asharov and Lindell
in [2].
2We are inspired by the standard ideal/real world definition for multi-party protocols proposed by Canetti [9].
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• Compare: The protocol of Nishide and Ohta [37] for securely comparing two secret-shared
values.
• Multiply: Multiplies two secret-shared values. Defined as Protocol 2 in this section.
• RenewShares: The share renewal protocol of Herzberg et al. [27] for re-randomizing shares of
a secret-shared value. This makes past knowledge of the adversary obsolete after re-sharing
the secret.
• Reconst: Given a shared secret s, reconstructs s via polynomial interpolation and error cor-
rection. Defined as Protocol 4 in Section B.
Protocol 1 AnonymousBroadcast
1. Setup: Parties jointly run the quorum building protocol of Theorem 4 with all parties to agree on n
good quorums Q1, ..., Qn, and assign each gate Gi to the (i mod n)-th quorum, for all i ∈ [m].
2. Input Sharing: Parties Pi and Pi+1 secret share their inputs xi and xi+1 among all parties of Q⌈i/2⌉
using the VSS scheme of Theorem 2, for all i ∈ [n].
3. Random Generation: Parties in each input quorum Q⌈i/2⌉ run GenRand twice to generate sharings
〈ri〉 and 〈ri+1〉 of two random elements ri, ri+1 ∈ Zp, for some prime q. At the end of this step, Q⌈i/2⌉
holds two pairs of sharings (〈ri〉, 〈xi〉) and (〈ri+1〉, 〈xi+1〉), for all i ∈ [n].
4. Circuit Computation: The circuit is evaluated level-by-level starting from the input gates. For
each gate G and the quorum Q associated with it, parties in Q do the following.
(a) Gate Computation: Let (〈r〉, 〈x〉) and (〈r′〉, 〈x′〉) be the sharings associated with the inputs
of G. Parties compute 〈ρ〉 = Compare(〈r〉, 〈r′〉), where ρ = (r ≤ r′). Then, they compute the
output pairs (〈s〉, 〈y〉) and (〈s′〉, 〈y′〉) from
〈s〉 = 〈ρ〉 · 〈r〉 + (1− 〈ρ〉) · 〈r′〉
〈y〉 = 〈ρ〉 · 〈x〉 + (1− 〈ρ〉) · 〈x′〉
〈s′〉 = 〈ρ〉 · 〈r′〉+ (1− 〈ρ〉) · 〈r〉
〈y′〉 = 〈ρ〉 · 〈x′〉+ (1 − 〈ρ〉) · 〈x〉
(1)
For every addition over two shared values 〈a〉 and 〈b〉 performed above, parties computes 〈c〉 =
〈a〉+ 〈b〉. For every multiplication, they run 〈c〉 = Multiply(〈a〉, 〈b〉).
(b) Output Resharing: Parties run RenewShares over 〈s〉, 〈y〉, 〈s′〉, and 〈y′〉 to re-share them in
the quorum associated with the parent gate.
5. Output Propagation: Let (〈si〉, 〈yi〉) and (〈si+1〉, 〈yi+1〉) be the pairs of shared values each output
quorum Q′i receives. Parties in Q
′
i run zi= Reconst(〈yi〉) and zi+1= Reconst(〈yi+1〉) and send (zi,zi+1)
to all n parties. Each party receiving a set of N pairs from each output quorum, chooses one pair via
majority filtering and considers it as the output of that quorum.
We prove the correctness and secrecy of Protocol 1 (and Theorem 1) in Section A.2. In Lemma 4,
we show that for sufficiently large k > 0 and p > 32kn
2 log n, this protocol computes a random
permutation of the input messages with high probability. We also prove the following lemmas in
Section A.2.1.
Lemma 1. Using the perfectly-secure VSS of Theorem 2, Protocol 1 sends O˜(n) bits, computes
O˜(n) operations, and takes O(log n) rounds of communication for shuffling n messages.
Lemma 2. Using the cryptographic VSS of Theorem 3, Protocol 1 sends O(n log5 n) messages of
size O(κ+ log n) and computes O(n(κ+ log n) log5 n) operations for shuffling n messages, where κ
is the security parameter. The protocol has O(log n) rounds of communication.
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We now describe the subprotocol Multiply that is based on a well-known technique proposed by
Beaver [4]. The technique generates a shared multiplication triple (〈u〉, 〈v〉, 〈w〉) such that w = u ·v.
The triple is then used to convert multiplications over shared values into additions. Since the triple
generation step is independent of the inputs, it can be done in a preprocessing phase. Moreover,
since each triple acts like a one-time pad, a fresh triple must be used for each multiplication.
Protocol 2 Multiply
Usage. Initially, parties hold two secret-shared values 〈a〉 = (a1, ..., aN) and 〈b〉 = (b1, ..., bN) that are on a
polynomial of degree N/3. The protocol computes a shared value 〈c〉 = (c1, ..., cN ) such that c = a · b.
Multiply(〈a〉, 〈b〉) :
For all i ∈ [N ], party Pi performs the following steps.
1. Pi runs GenRand twice with other parties to generate two shared random values ui and vi both on
polynomials of degree N/6. Then, he computes wi = ui · vi
2. Pi updates ui, vi, and wi by running RenewShares.
3. Pi computes εi = ai + ui and δi = bi + vi and runs ε = Reconst(εi) and δ = Reconst(δi). Then, he
computes ci = wi + δai + εbi − εδ.
Clearly, ε and δ can be safely revealed to all parties so that each party can compute εδ locally.
The correctness and the secrecy of the algorithm are proved by Beaver [4]. The only difference
between Beaver’s original method and our protocol is as follows. Following [5], he proposes to
generate shared random elements u and v on a polynomial of degree N/3 and multiply them to
get a polynomial of degree 2N/3 for w. Then, a degree reduction algorithm is run to reduce the
degree from 2N/3 to N/3. Instead of this, we choose polynomials of degree N/6 for u and v to
get a polynomial of degree N/3 for w. In our protocol, since up to N/6 of parties are dishonest is
each quorum, we can do this without revealing any information to the adversary. We prove this
formally in Lemma 5 and Lemma 6.
One issue with multiplying shares, as noticed by Ben-Or et al. [5], is that the resulting poly-
nomial is not completely random because, for example, the product of two polynomials cannot
be irreducible. To solve this, we simply re-randomize the shares via RenewShare. Moreover, since
〈u〉 and 〈v〉 are on degree N/6 polynomials and Multiply uses them to mask-and-reveal the inputs
(that are on degree N/3 polynomials) in the last step, it is necessary to randomize 〈u〉 and 〈v〉 via
RenewShares before masking. This puts the shared values 〈u〉 and 〈v〉 on new random polynomials
with degree N/3.
Definition 1. [Perfect Random Permutation] Consider a set of n ≥ 1 elements A = {a1, a2, ...an}.
A perfect random permutation of A is a permutation chosen uniformly at random from the set of
all possible n! permutations of A.
Lemma 3. Consider a sequence of input pairs (r1, x1), ..., (rn, xn), and a sorting protocol Π that
sorts the pairs according to their first elements. Π computes a perfect random permutation of the
pairs if their first elements are chosen uniformly at random and are distinct.
Proof. LetX = (r1, x1), ..., (rn, xn) be the input sequence and Y = (s1, y1), ..., (sn, yn) be the output
sequence of Π. Note s1, ..., snis the sorted sequence of {r1, ..., rn}. An arbitrary output sequence of
pairs Y ′ = (s′1, y
′
1), ..., (s
′
n, y
′
n) is said to be equal to Y if yi = y
′
i, for all i ∈ [n]. We want to prove
that the probability of Y ′ being equal to Y is 1n! . In general, for any i ∈ [n], yi = y
′
i if and only if s
′
i
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is the i-th smallest element in {r1, ..., rn} conditioned on knowing the i−1 smallest elements, which
happens with probability 1n−i+1 . Thus, the probability that Y = Y
′ is 1n ·
1
n−1 · ... ·
1
2 · 1 =
1
n! .
In the random generation step of Protocol 1, it is possible that two or more input quorums choose
the same random elements from Zp. In this situation, we say a collision happens. Collisions reduce
the level of anonymity our protocol guarantees because the higher the probability of collisions,
the higher the chance the adversary is given in guessing the correct sequence of inputs. On the
other hand, we observe that if the field size (i.e., p) is sufficiently large, then the probability of
collisions becomes overwhelmingly small. Lemma 4 gives a lower bound on p such that collisions
are guaranteed to happen with negligible probability.
Lemma 4. Let Zp be the field of random elements generated in the random generation step of
Protocol 1. The probability there is a collision between any two parties is negligible if p > 32kn
2 log n,
for some k > 0.
Proof. Based on Theorem 4, all input quorums are good. Based on the correctness of GenRand,
all elements generated by the input quorums in the random generation step of Protocol 1 are
chosen uniformly at random and independent of all other random elements generated throughout
the protocol. Let Pi and Pj be two parties and ri and rj be the random values assigned to them
respectively by their corresponding input quorums. The probability that ri = rj is 1/p. Let Xij be
the following indicator random variable and Y be a random variable giving the number of collisions
between any two parties,
Xij =
{
1, ri = rj
0, otherwise
, Y =
∑
i,j∈[n]
Xij .
Using the linearity of expectations,
E(Y ) = E
( ∑
i,j∈[n]
Xij
)
=
∑
i,j∈[n]
E(Xij) =
1
p
(n2 ) =
n(n− 1)
2p
.
We want to find an upper bound on the probability of collisions using the Chernoff bound defined
by
Pr(Y ≥ (1 + α)E(Y )) ≤ e−
α
2
E(Y )
3 .
To ensure that no collision happens with high probability, we need to have (1 + α)E(Y ) < 1 while
e−
α
2
E(Y )
3 < 1
nk
, for any k > 0. Choosing α < 1E(Y ) − 1 and solving the inequalities for E(Y ) we get
e−
α
2
E(Y )
3 < 1
nk
⇒ e−
α
2
E(Y )
3 < e−k logn ⇒ 1 − α
2E(Y )
3 < −k log n ⇒
(α+1)2E(Y )
3 >
k log n ⇒
1
3E(Y ) > k log n ⇒ E(Y ) <
1
3k logn
Since E(Y ) = n(n−1)2p <
1
3k logn , solving this for p gives the bound p >
3
2kn
2 log n and α <
3k log n− 1.
5 Simulation Results
To study the feasibility of our scheme and compare it to previous work, we implemented an ex-
perimental simulation of our protocol and three other protocols which can be used for shuffling n
inputs randomly (with traffic-analysis resistance) in the same setting. These protocols are due to
Dani et al. [16], Boyle et al. [7], and Zamani et al. [44]. To the best of our knowledge, these protocols
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have the best scalability with respect to the network size among other works described in the liter-
ature for the same setting. Since the protocols of [16] and [7] are general MPC algorithms, we use
them for running our shuffling technique described in Section 4. The protocol of [44] is a jamming-
resistant version of DC-Nets that scales better than other DC-Net protocols [11, 23, 41, 42]. We
stress that we are interested in evaluating our protocols for large network sizes and hence, our
choice of protocols for this section is based on their scalability for large n’s. One may find other
protocols in the literature that perform better than the protocols of our choice for small n’s.
We run our protocol for inputs chosen from Zp with a 160-bit prime p for getting about 80 bits
of security. We set the parameters of our protocol in such a way that we ensure the probability
of error for the quorum building algorithm of [8] is smaller than 10−5. For the sorting circuit, we
set k = 2 to get ǫ < 10−8 for all values of n in the experiment. Clearly, for larger values of n, the
error becomes superpolynomially smaller, e.g., for n = 225, we get ǫ < 10−300. For all protocols
evaluated in this section, we assume cheating (by malicious parties) happens in every round of the
protocols. This is essential for evaluating various strategies used by these protocols for tolerating
active attacks.
Figure 1 illustrates the simulation results obtained for various network sizes between 25 and 230
(i.e., between 32 and about 1 billion). To better compare the protocols, the vertical and horizontal
axis of the plot are scaled logarithmically. The x-axis presents the number of parties and the
y-axis presents the number of Kilobytes sent by each party for delivering one anonymous bit. In
this figure, we report results from three different versions of our protocols. The first plot (marked
with circles) belongs to our unconditionally-secure protocol that uses the perfectly-secure VSS
scheme of Katz et al. [30]. The second plot (marked with stars) represents our computationally-
secure protocol which uses the cryptographic VSS of Kate et al. [29]. The last plot (marked with
diamonds) shows the cost of the cryptographic protocol with amortized (averaged) setup cost. To
obtain the amortized plot, we run the setup phase of Protocol 1 once and then used the setup data
to run our online protocol 100 times. The total number of bits sent was then divided by 100 to get
the average communication cost. To achieve better results, we also generated a sufficient number
of random triples in the setup phase. Then, the triples were used by our multiplication subprotocol
in the online phase to multiply secret-shared values efficiently.
We observe that our protocols (even the unconditional version) perform significantly better than
the other protocols. For example, for n = 220 (about 1 million parties1), the amortized protocol
requires each party to send about 64KB of data per anonymous bit delivered (about 8MB for our
crypto version and about 64MB for our unconditional version) while the protocols of [7], [16], and
[44] each send more than one Terabytes of data per party and per anonymous bit delivered.
6 Conclusion and Open Problems
We described an anonymous broadcast protocol that is fully decentralized and tolerates up to
n/6 active faults. Moreover, our protocol is load-balanced and can tolerate traffic-analysis at-
tacks. The amount of information sent and the amount of computations performed by each party
scales polylogarithmically with the number of parties. The scalability is achieved by performing
local communications and computations in groups of logarithmic size and by relaxing the latency
requirements.
Several open problems remain. First, can we decrease the number of rounds of our protocol
using a smaller-depth sorting circuit? For example, since our protocol sorts uniform random num-
bers, it seems possible to use a smaller depth non-comparison-based sorting circuit like bucket sort.
1This is less than 1% of the number of active Twitter users. An intriguing application of our protocol is an
anonymous version of Twitter.
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Figure 1: Communication cost of anonymous broadcast protocols.
Second, can we improve performance even further by detecting and blacklisting parties that exhibit
adversarial behavior? Finally, can we adopt our results to the asynchronous model of communica-
tion? We believe that this is possible for a suitably chosen upper bound on the fraction of faulty
parties.
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A Correctness and Security Proofs
In this section, we prove the correctness and secrecy of our protocols.
A.1 Proof of Multiply
We have already showed the correctness of the Multiply and now prove the secrecy of the algorithm.
We first define t-secrecy, a property required for the proof of secrecy.
Definition 2. [t-secrecy] A secret-shared value defined over a polynomial φ is said to have t-
secrecy if and only if
1. it is t-private meaning that no set of at most t parties can compute φ(0), and
2. it is t-resilient meaning that no set of t or less parties can prevent the other n− t remaining
parties from correctly reconstructing φ(0).
Lemma 5. The Shamir’s secret sharing scheme has the following properties.
1. A sharing defined over a polynomial of degree d has d-secrecy if the adversary has less than
d of the shares.
2. Let φ1 and φ2 be independent random polynomials of degree d1 and d2 that correspond to
sharings with d1-secrecy and d2-secrecy respectively. φ3 = φ1 + φ2 is a polynomial of degree
d3 = max(d1, d2) that corresponds to a sharing with d3-secrecy.
3. Let φ1 and φ2 be polynomials of degree d that correspond to two sharings both with d-secrecy.
φ3 = φ1 · φ2 is a polynomial of degree 2d that corresponds to a sharing with d-secrecy.
Proof. The first property follows from the definition. The second property is correct due to the
linearity Shamir’s scheme. Without loss of generality, let d1 ≤ d2. Intuitively, if we assume that
the sharing defined by φ3 does not have d2-secrecy. Then, parties compute φ2 = φ3 − φ1. Thus,
they can find φ2(0) (or similarly prevent others from learning φ2(0)). This contradicts with the
fact that φ2 corresponds to a sharing with d2-secrecy. For a complete proof, we refer the reader
to Claim 3.4 of [2]. The third property is correct because considering an arbitrary Pi holding two
shares ai and bi on polynomials φ1 and φ2 respectively, Pi learns nothing from ai · bi other than
what is revealed from ai and bi since Pi computes it locally. So, the resulting shared value also has
d-secrecy.
Lemma 6. Let 〈a〉 and 〈b〉 be two secret-shared values both with N/3-secrecy and 〈c〉 = Multiply(〈a〉, 〈b〉).
The sharing 〈c〉 has N/3-secrecy.
Proof. In the first step of Multiply, algorithm GenRand creates two shared values 〈u〉 = (u1, ..., uN )
and 〈v〉 = (v1, ..., vN ) that correspond to degree N/6 polynomials. Lemma 5 proves that 〈u〉 and
〈v〉 both have N/6-secrecy. For each party Pi, based on Lemma 5, wi = ui ·vi defines a new sharing
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that is on a polynomial of degree N/3 and has N/6-secrecy. Moreover, 〈a〉 and 〈b〉 both are on
polynomials of degree N/3 and have N/3-secrecy. Thus, based on Lemma 5, ci = wi+δai+εbi−εδ
defines a new sharing 〈c〉 that is on a polynomial of degree N/3 and has N/3-secrecy.
Lemma 7. Given two secret-shared values 〈a〉 and 〈b〉, the protocol Multiply correctly returns a
shared value 〈c〉 such that c = a · b.
Proof. Follows from the proof of [4].
A.2 Proof of Theorem 1
In this section, we prove our main theorem (Theorem 1). We prove in the real/ideal world model as
described by Canetti [9]. First, we consider the protocol in an ideal model. In this model, all parties
send their input to a trusted party who computes the shuffling circuit. Then, it sends the result
to all parties. Let A be the sequence of inputs and A′ be the sequence of sorted inputs according
to the random numbers associated with them. Recall that we have at least n − t honest parties.
Based on Lemma 3 and conditioned on the event that no collision happens with high probability
(Lemma 4), the elements of A′ that correspond to honest parties can be any permutation of the
elements of honest parties in A. In other words, the probability that the adversary can successfully
map A′ to A is less than 1(n−t)! which guarantees (n−t)-anonymity (i.e., full anonymity). Protocol 1
is the realization of the above ideal model. The real model computes the circuit in a multi-party
setting. We prove this realization is correct and secure.
Setup. The correctness and secrecy follows from the proof of Theorem 4.
Input Sharing. The correctness and secrecy follows from the proof of the VSS scheme used ([30,
29]). After this step, each input quorum Qi has a correct sharing of Pi’s input. This is the base
case for our proof of circuit computation step.
Random Generation. The correctness and secrecy follows from the proof of the GenRand algo-
rithm.
Circuit Computation. Correctness. We prove by induction in the real/ideal model. The invari-
ant is that if the input shares are correct, then the output of each gate is equal to the output when
the gate is computed by a trusted party in the ideal model, and the result is shared between parties
of the quorum correctly. For the base case, note that the invariant is true for input gates. Induc-
tion step is based on the universal composability of Compare and Multiply. Moreover, based on the
correctness of RenewShares, the output resharing step generates new shares without changing the
output.
Secrecy. We prove by induction. The adversary cannot obtain any information about the inputs
and outputs during the computation of each gate of the circuit. Let Q, and Q′ be two quorums
involved in the computation of a gate, where Q provides an input to the gate, and Q′ computes
the gate. Consider a party P . Let S be the set of all shares P receives during the protocol. We
consider two cases. First, if P /∈ (Q ∪ Q′), then elements of S are independent of the shares Q
sends to Q′. Moreover, elements of S are independent of the output of Q′ since Q′ also re-shares
its output(s). Hence, S reveals nothing about the inputs and outputs of the gate.
Second, if P ∈ (Q ∪ Q′), then the inductive invariant is that the collection of all shares held by
dishonest parties in Q and Q′ does not give the adversary any information about the inputs and the
outputs. As the base case, it is clear that the invariant is valid for input gates. The induction step
is as follows. The adversary can obtain at most 2(N/6) = N/3 shares of any shared value during
the computation step; N/6 from dishonest parties in Q and N/6 from dishonest parties in Q′. By
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the secrecy of the VSS scheme, at least N/3 + 1 shares are required for reconstructing the secret.
By the secrecy of RenewShares and Multiply, when at most N/3 of the shares are revealed, the
secrecy of the computation step is proved using universal computability of multi-party protocols.
Lemma 8. The gate computation step of Protocol 1 obliviously swaps the pairs (r, x) and (r′, x′)
according to their first, i.e., if r ≤ r′, then this step outputs (〈s〉, 〈y〉) = (〈r〉, 〈x〉) and (〈s′〉, 〈y′〉) =
(〈r′〉, 〈x′〉). Otherwise, it outputs (〈s〉, 〈y〉) = (〈r′〉, 〈x′〉) and (〈s′〉, 〈y′〉) = (〈r〉, 〈x〉). In both cases,
the adversary remains oblivious of which output is mapped to the first (second) input pair.
Proof. Let ρ = Compare(r, r′). Based on the correctness and security of Compare (see [37]), ρ = 1
if and only if r ≤ r′ and ρ = 0, otherwise. Also, the adversary does not learn anything about r
and r′. If ρ = 1, then based on Equation 1, the linearity of the VSS scheme, and the correctness
and secrecy of Multiply (Lemmata 6 and 7), s = r, y = x, s′ = r′, and y′ = x′. Otherwise, s = r′,
y = x′, s′ = r, and y′ = x.
Output Propagation. The correctness and secrecy follows from the proof of the subprotocol
Reconst.
A.2.1 Proof of Lemma 1 and Lemma 2
We first compute the cost of each step of the protocol separately and then compute the total cost.
Let ν1(n) and ν2(n) be the communication and computation complexity of the VSS subprotocol
respectively when it is invoked among n parties. As stated in Theorem 2 and Theorem 3 both VSS
protocols used in this paper take constant rounds of communication.
• Setup. The communication and computation costs are equal to those costs of the quorum
building algorithm of Theorem 4, which is O˜(1) for each party. This protocol takes constant
rounds of communication.
• Input Broadcast. The input broadcast step invokes the VSS protocol n times among N =
O(log n) parties. So, this step sends O(n · ν1(N)) bits and performs O(n · ν2(N)) operations.
Since the VSS scheme is constant-round, this step also takes constant rounds.
• Random Generation. It is easy to see that the subprotocol GenRand sends O(N · ν1(N))
messages, performs O(N · ν2(N)), and has constant rounds.
• Circuit Computation. The sorting network of Leighton and Plaxton [35] has O(n log n) gates.
So, the communication cost of this step is equal to the communication and computation
cost of running O(n log n) instantiations of Compare and RenewShares. Compare requires
O(log q) invocation of Multiply which sends O(N ·ν1(N)) messages and computes O(N ·ν2(N))
operations. RenewShares also sends O(N · ν1(N)) messages and computes O(N · ν2(N))
operations. Hence, the circuit computation phase sends O(n log n · log q ·N · ν1(N)) messages
computes O(n log n · log q · N · ν2(N)) . Since the sorting network has depth O(log n), and
Compare takes constant rounds, this steps takes O(log n) rounds of communication.
• Output Propagation. The costs are equal to the communication and computation costs of
running n invocations of Reconst which costs O(N2), plus sending the outputs to all parties,
which costs O(n2N). Thus, this step costs O(n2N). Since Reconst is a constant-round
protocol, this step takes constant rounds.
• Total. Since q > 32kn
2 log n, for a constant k, q = O(n3) and log q = O(log n). Using eVSS,
we get ν1(N) = ν2(N) = N
2 = O(log2 n). Thus, Protocol 1 sends O(n log5 n) messages of size
O(κ+ log n), computes O(n(κ+ log n) log5 n) operations for shuffling n messages (excluding
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the output step). This proves Lemma 2. For Lemma 1, since ν1(N) = ν2(N) = O(poly(N)),
Protocol 1 sends O˜(n) bits and computes O˜(n) operations for shuffling n messages. This
proves Lemma 1. In both cases, the output propagation step costs O(n2 log n) field elements.
Finally, in both cases, the protocol requires O(log n) rounds of communication. This finishes
the proof of Theorem 1.
B Remaining Algorithms
Beaver [4] describes a simple technique for generating uniform random secrets by adding shared
values chosen uniformly at random by each party. Such a random shared value is used in several
parts of our protocol. The following subprotocol implements this technique.
Protocol 3 GenRand
Usage. Parties jointly generate a shared value 〈r〉 = (r1, ..., rn) where r is chosen uniformly at random from
Zp.
GenRand():
For all i ∈ [n],
1. Party Pi chooses ρi ∈ Zp uniformly at random and secret shares it among all parties.
2. Let ρ1i, ..., ρNi be the shares Pi receives from the previous step. Pi computes ri =
∑n
j=1 ρji.
In the malicious setting, it is possible that dishonest parties send spurious shares during secret
reconstruction phase. In eVSS [29] (used in the cryptographic version of our protocol), this is
solved by asking all parties to broadcast a proof (called witness) during reconstruction to verify
broadcast shares. In our protocol, reconstruction is postponed to after circuit computation. Since
the witnesses are generated in the sharing phase at the beginning of the computation, and the
witnesses do not have necessary homomorphic properties, we cannot use them in our reconstruction
phase. Instead, we correct corruptions using a BCH decoding algorithm (e.g., the algorithm of
Berlekamp and Welch [6]) as in normal secret reconstruction [4]. This technique is also used in the
VSS of Katz et al. [30] and is implemented in the following subprotocol.
Protocol 4 Reconst
Usage. Initially, all parties jointly hold a shared value 〈a〉 = (a1, ..., an). Using this algorithm, parties jointly
reconstruct the secret, i.e., all parties learn the value a.
Reconst(〈a〉):
For all i ∈ [n],
1. Party Pi sends its share ai to all parties via one-to-one communication.
2. Let α1, ..., αn be the messages Pi receives from the previous step. Pi computes a degree d = n/3
polynomial φ(x) using the Lagrange interpolation polynomial,
φ(x) =
d+1∑
i=1
αi
d+1∏
j=1,j 6=i
(x− j)(i − j)−1
3. For all j ∈ [n], if there exists at least one αj such that φ(j) 6= αj , then Pi runs the decoding algorithm
of Berlekamp and Welch [6] to recover the correct polynomial φ′(x) of degree d. For all j ∈ [k], if
φ′(j) 6= αj , then Pi concludes that Pj is dishonest and must be disqualified.
18
